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Abstract: In this essay I explore a major figure within the U.S. legal system history: Justice Benjamin 
Nathan Cardozo. Even though he was a product of his time and did not transform the judicial system in 
general, he was crucial in unmasking the processes by which a judge chooses and limits his application of 
the law, thereby having great impact on judicial debates in the decades that followed him. In order to 
present this, after briefly discussing his jurisprudence, I present some of his major cases, which settle 
some legal principles and doctrines that are still active nowadays. 
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.: Wagner v. International Railway Company; 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 
 
Resumen: En este ensayo exploré una de las grandes figuras de la historia legal de los Estados Unidos de 
América: el juez del Tribunal Supremo Benjamin Nathan Cardozo. A pesar de que fue un producto de su 
tiempo y de que, en realidad, en su momento, no logró transformar el Sistema judicial en general, lo 
cierto es que su tarea fue crucial a la hora de desenmascarar los procesos legales desde un punto de vista 
judicial hasta el punto que su huella siguió muy presenta décadas después, estando aun muy presente 
incluso hoy día. Para llevar a cabo mi propósito, y después de hablar brevemente de su teoría legal, 
presento algunos de sus casos más importantes, a partir de los cuales sentó precedentes legales aun en 
boga.  
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An important figure who has made a major impact in the field of law is Justice 
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo (1870-1938). Even though he was a product of his time and 
did not transform the judicial system in general, he was crucial in unmasking the 
processes by which a judge chooses and limits his application of the law, thereby 
having great impact on judicial debates in the decades that followed him. He was 
instrumental in looking at an otherwise disordered and at times, prescriptive approach 
and unraveled the processes by which decision-making should happen for a justice. In 
 
1 Enric Mallorquí-Ruscalleda (PhD Princeton) teaches Spanish Literature and Translation Studies and is 
the Director of the Program in Spanish at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Although he 
is primarily a scholar of literary and cultural studies, he also has a huge interest in law. Among other 
professional legal national and state associations, he is a member of The Southern California Mediation 




fact, the publication by Yale University Press of The Nature of the Judicial Process 
(1921) is considered the second most influential writing of the twentieth century 
regarding legal theory (Miraut 2). As a native of the Big Apple, during his eighteen-
year tenure in the New York Court of Appeals, which began in 1914, Cardozo 
cemented his ideas through his lived experiences. The focus of this study is to in fact, 
connect his time in the Court of Appeals, with his decision-making by looking at three 
specific cases from 1916, 1921, and 1928, and simultaneously demonstrate that his 
actions reflected the ideals, thoughts and methods included in his famous 1921 text 
noted above. Those would later serve him as a justice of the United States Supreme 
Court.  
 
Cardozo contributed through his writings and ideas in many ways but of 
particular interest here are his ideas regarding the legal thought process, as explained 
by Richard D. Friedman in “Cardozo the [Small r] realist:” “His historical significance 
lies almost entirely in his judicial opinions and in his other formal legal writings” 
(1740). Among his significant judicial opinions are his reflections on jurisprudence 
theory and the four methods that should be applied to decision-making. Through 
specific cases, I will explore how his theories interacted with his understanding of the 
role of privity in contracts, the tort concept of duty and proximate cause, as well as 
how unforeseeable consequences must be accounted for in protecting social well-
being. Additionally, he formulated theories on moral equality that were based on an 
understanding of society having access to the same opportunities and these ideals were 
also explained in his texts and upheld in the courtroom. 
 
Curiously, these contributions can be closely studied and understood by 
looking at a key year in Cardozo’s professional life; both the text described above as 
well as a key cases from the years he served as justice in the New York Court of 
Appeals, were foundational in the broader impact made by Justice Cardozo during his 
lifetime and beyond. Furthermore, of the many questions he asked in The Nature of 
the Judicial Process, there is one in particular that underlines his understanding of the 
role of the judge when laws do not explicitly point in any particular direction. In his 
own words, he pondered: “At what point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant 
custom, by some consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common 
standards of justice and morals?” (10). Given such profound considerations in his 
writings and despite his brief service to the United States Supreme Court and death in 
1938, his legacy continued through most of the 20th century and beyond. 
 
Justice Cardozo’s Jurisprudence: The Instrumental Character of Legal 
Language 
 
Regarding his jurisprudence or philosophy of law, Cardozo wanted to explore 
the instrumental character of legal language. As Daniel G. Stroup notes in “Law and 
Language: Cardozo’s Jurisprudence and Wittegenstein’s Philosophy:” “It is because 
the outcome of legal discourse carries such great consequence for the everyday lives 
of the population at large that the element of continuity in that discourse takes on such 
great importance” (332). For Cardozo in particular through his text, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process, this core idea of legal language and its tangible connection to the 
real, every day world, becomes apparent. For him, there are customary and natural 
behaviors for human interactions that become the basis from which to draw legal 
language and its real-world implications. The law exists outside of the judge but in 
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cases where there are gaps, judges must interpret and apply the law as they see fit. As 
Edwin Patterson explains in “Cardozo’s Philosophy of Law,” “Finally, in his avowed 
and often exemplified distrust of conventional formulas and in his insistence that the 
rule must fit the case and not the case the rule, he shows that faith in the power of 
reflective problem-solving, as an interplay of data and ideas” (72). Furthermore, 
Cardozo understood that there were consequences to decision-making particularly in 
overruling past decisions or asserting new interpretations of the law.  
 
For this purpose, he identified four methods that have had great significance. 
For Cardozo, as Patterson and also Stroup explain, there were four methods that could 
be applied in reaching a legal decision. Among them are logical progression to be able 
to follow a sequential development of the facts of a case, evolution that brings 
historical elements into decision-making, tradition or custom so that a judge may 
know how to apply rules to society, and finally, society as a whole so that its needs 
and welfare drive legal decision-making. Thus, a judge is called to determine “the 
comparative importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted 
or impaired” (Stroup 344). In this sense, Cardozo made great strides in removing 
jurisprudence from absolutist points of view by demonstrating that the law needed to 
remain flexible without becoming relativist in order to best serve society as a whole. 
With the intent of holding social welfare as the greatest of goods, he sought the right 
approach and language to do so but was many times at a loss to find the needed words 
for his new, alternate position. Ultimately, his writings and professional life 
demonstrated his ideal that the law should serve society and that there was a fine 
balance between maintaining tradition and modernizing the legal system to reflect the 
values of the other branches of government, namely the executive and legislative 
branches. 
  
3. Justice Cardozo’s Main Cases 
 
3.1. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 
 
Well-known examples of Cardozo’s willingness to fill-in legal gaps and apply 
the law for the good of society as a whole can be demonstrated through a review of 
three of his most famous cases that involve duty of care to an individual when 
confronted with larger companies that provide services and goods to society. A classic 
example of Cardozo’s defense of society as a whole can be seen through MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co.2 reviewed by the Court of Appeals of New York in 1916. In this 
case, there was a defective wheel installed by Buick Motor Co. on a car sold to a 
dealership, purchased by the MacPherson couple, that later caused an accident and 
injury. Here the issue was the privity of the contract since Buick had not directly sold 
the defective car to the MacPhersons. Additionally, the defective tire had been 
purchased by Buick not made by this company. Given that vehicles were intended for 
consumers of the general public, it is not surprising that Cardozo found that the 
manufacturer of a car part, as well as Buick Motor Co. responsible for assembling the 
car, were equally responsible in ensuring public safety. In this case, the date is 
important given that vehicles had not been a mainstream part of society for very long. 
In fact, for only about a decade had vehicles been available to the public. Here is 
where Cardozo’s method of history comes into play. It was not previously possible to 
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abstractly contemplate the construction of vehicles, how they are manufactured, who 
would purchase them, and anticipate issues that could go wrong in order to use 
Cardozo’s method of philosophy to produce laws that would coincide with this new 
technology. Rather, as society was confronted with new manufactured goods, and the 
consequences of poor workmanship in relation to companies such as Buick and 
consumers such as the MacPherson couple, the judicial system had to play its part in 
deciding the legal outcomes of these new products and relationships. Cardozo himself 
expressed this in his 1921 text: “I mean simply that history, in illuminating the past, 
illuminates the present, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future” (53). 
From this perspective, it is clear that Cardozo understood that vehicles would continue 
to be part of the present and future, and that consumers of them, would continue to be 
at the mercy of well-made products to ensure their safety and well-being in using 
them. Clearly, social well-being for the present and the future played a key role as 
Cardozo relied on his method of history to reach this decision. 
 
3.2. Wagner v. International Railway Company 
 
Similarly, Cardozo found for Wagner in the famous 1921 ruling of Wagner v. 
International Railway Company. 3  Here he imposed liability on a defendant, the 
International Railway Company, for the injuries suffered by a person who came to the 
rescue of another. In this case, Arthur Wagner was trying to help his cousin, Herbert 
Wagner, who had fallen out of the train as it took a curve and simultaneously lurched. 
As he de-boarded the train to help his cousin in the dark and near a bridge, he also 
suffered injuries when he lost his footing. Through the case, which ended-up in the 
New York Court of Appeals, Arthur Wagner, despite choosing himself to go look for 
his cousin, asked that his injuries be considered in relation to the cause of the initial 
injury, which later became known as “proximate cause.” In this case, it was 
determined that a person injured (Arthur Wagner) while trying to rescue another 
person (his cousin, Herbert Wagner) who was impacted by the defendant’s negligence 
may also recover damages. In Cardozo’s own words: “We may assume, though we are 
not required to decide, that peril and rescue must be in substance one transaction; that 
the sight of the one must have aroused the impulse to the other; in short, that there 
must be unbroken continuity between the commission of the wrong and the effort to 
avert its consequences” (https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/1451). Here Cardozo 
focused on the importance of the relationship between the initial negligence that 
resulted in the cousin falling-out of the train and the subsequent risk taken by Arthur 
Wagner that resulted in a second injury related to the first. For Cardozo the 
International Railway Company had a duty not only to the initial victim but also to 
Mr. Arthur Wagner for the injuries suffered in trying to rescue his cousin.  
 
Thus, this case is an example of the real-world response that Cardozo made as 
judge considering previous legal practice but also understanding that the ambiguity of 
the law required that he take other and all factors into consideration in his decision 
while also bearing in mind the impact that it should have on the rest of society. It is in 
this context that he considered and applied the method of custom. For Cardozo custom 
does not refer to the behaviors of different social groups, rather it speaks to judicial 
decisions and how their traditions create customs. As he explains it in The Nature of 
the Judicial Process: “In these days, at all events, we look to custom, not so much for 
the creation of new rules, but for the tests and standards that are to determine how 
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established rules shall be applied” (56). From this perspective, in Wagner v. 
International Railway Company, there was a clear issue of neglect that made the 
cousin fall out of the train to begin with. Even though the train lurched, it should not 
be the case that in its movement through the train tracks, passengers should fall out. 
The safety of all passengers using trains was a key factor in the decision made. For 
Cardozo, the natural expectation in boarding and using a train, is that you will remain 
on-board until you reach your destination; it is unnatural and therefore wrong to 
expect to fall out as you are travelling. That point is clear in the case but the ambiguity 
arose in the behavior, subsequent decisions, and injury sustained by Arthur Wagner. 
Neither the methods of philosophy nor history could in this case guide Cardozo, as 
that second injury arose out of vary particular circumstances. Yet, Cardozo understood 
that his decision would ultimately create a new custom or tradition in ruling and as 
expected, he ruled in favor of what would benefit society as a whole by extending duty 
of care to proximate cause and highlighting the relationship of that first injury to the 
second one. 
 
3.3. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 
 
Again, in the 1928 New York Court of Appeals case, Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad Co.,4  he broadened the understanding of negligence to demonstrate that 
unforeseeable consequences do play a role and that society as a whole must be 
protected. In this case, Mrs. Palsgraf was injured by the fireworks that were set off 
when they fell form an unidentifiable package held by a man who lost his balance 
while boarding the train. Even though there was no intention to cause harm, the Court 
of Appeals found that there is a broader responsibility to protect society against 
unforeseen dangers rather than to protect individuals under specific circumstances. 
Once more, for Cardozo it was the railroad company that had a duty to protect its 
customers from such harm. When the methods of philosophy, history or custom did 
not clarify a direction for Cardozo, he relied on the most important method of all, 
sociology. He felt that it was his duty as a justice to understand and discover what 
constituted social welfare or social justice in his decision-making. In this case, Mrs. 
Palsgraf was engaging in natural behavior, waiting on a platform when she was 
injured. Additionally, the person and item that caused her harm, was form a fellow 
traveler. In this case, all involved seemed to demonstrate both a normal intellect and 
conscience in their behavior, yet there was a serious injury. This is where Cardozo 
relied on what he called sociology to make a final decision; the Long Island Railway 
Company had a larger responsibility towards society as a whole, to protect it when 
using its trains. The decision of this case, certainly brought about greater awareness in 
the way train employees “helped” customers board a train, how dangerous packages 
should be labeled and transported in public areas, and the general role played by a 
public entity in ensuring that its customers were not injured when normally and 
naturally using its services. Therefore, in the three cases explained above, Cardozo 
was applying his methods of philosophy, history, tradition, and sociology to defend 
the well-being of society as a whole in its purchase of consumer goods such as a 
vehicle as well as the use of public transportation such as a train.  
 
In the cases discussed above, the application of his four methods came into 
play, particularly in relation to what he explained in the second lecture of his text The 
Nature of the Judicial Process, where he discusses his ideas of history, tradition, and 
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sociology. In that second lecture, Cardozo notes that “The great ideals of liberty and 
equality are preserved against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the 
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of those who 
have no patience with general principles, by enshrining them in constitutions, and 
consecrating to the task of their protection a body of defenders” (92). In other words, 
in order to protect liberty and equality for society as a whole, both public authority and 
judicial institutions must guard those great ideals since people do not have equal 
opportunities nor equal moral compasses. The decisions made by justices must reflect 
those limitations and freedoms that will ultimately give the greatest liberty to citizens 
as a whole by restraining the powerful and supporting the more socially 
disenfranchised. As Cardozo himself saw it: “Finally, when the social needs demand 
one settlement rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, 
ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends” (Cardozo 
65). If in the first case described above, Cardozo was using history as a method to 
determine the outcome of a defective car part that injured consumers, in the second, he 
was relying on judicial custom to establish new ways of protecting all through his 
understanding of “proximate cause.” Yet ultimately, as noted in the third case studied 
and his decision-making in general, all methods could and should be put aside when 
there was the larger question of social well-being at stake. His fourth and broadest 
method, sociology, was the most powerful in the decisions he made as justice both in 




Cardozo throughout his life continued revising and rethinking many of his 
legal opinions. He continued writing and expressing his views, always modifying and 
clarifying them with more acute understanding and language. An example of this 
progression and refinement can be seen through his later writings, particularly in The 
Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) as explained by Miraut Martin. In that later text, 
Cardozo explained that if human moral dignity is equivalent for all beings, then the 
social opportunities that they have access to must also be equivalent (Miraut Matin 3). 
Motivated by the ideal of the well-being of society as a whole, Cardozo considered 
that social opportunities should be equally accessed by the whole. In this same vein, 
equality for Cardozo was a social imperative that could then allow society to 
correspondingly access liberty. In cases where social beings were not equal such as in 
regard to minors or those who were not capable of seeking such rights, then Cardozo 
believed a justice had to take on a more paternalistic approach in defending weaker or 
less capable individuals so that they could also reap the benefits of accessing equal 
social opportunities.  
 
Yet Cardozo also understood that social beings do not always hold the same 
moral standards for themselves. Here again, he based his conclusions on the impact of 
history, tradition, and sociology to determine that there are such acts that can at any 
time and in any context be considered moral while others will be identified as 
immoral. For him, the role of a justice was once again to favor and uphold social 
morality for the good of the whole while not expecting either the highest standards of 
moral behavior nor the lowest in trying to respond to social needs and well-being in 
general. In this regard, the element of knowledge and understanding became crucial 
since morality could only come into play when individuals understood that there was a 
choice to be made when choosing how to behave, how to respond to a particular 
situation. In fact, one could argue that his perception that a normal person should be 
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inclined to save another, who is in serious danger, was ultimately the reason that he 
found for Arthur Wagner in the case described above. 
 
In his writings, and in particular his 1921 The Nature of the Judicial Process, 
Cardozo pondered the myriad of questions before a judge when making decisions and 
interpreting the law. He understood that individuals from different backgrounds and 
generations would understand the functioning of society in their own way but here is 
precisely Cardozo’s greatest contribution in responding to that ambiguity, it was the 
whole that should be prioritized within any particular historical moment. As 
demonstrated through this study, Cardozo took a reflective approach to his service as 
justice, understanding its limitations at every step but simultaneously creating various 
methods and responses so that his interpretation of the law could serve general social 
welfare rather than the individual. American society very much values individual 
rights and opportunities, Cardozo’s contributions to unmasking the judicial process on 
the one hand unraveled how a justice can and should approach the interpretation of the 
law but more importantly cemented social well-being as a key component of the 
judicial system in the United States. To this day, and particularly with the 
technological transformations undergone in the last two decades, Cardozo’s insistence 
that the judicial system needs to remain flexible and respond to the needs of the 
present while using the methods offered by philosophy, history, tradition, and 
sociology to respond to the well-being of society as a whole, remains as important 
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